Preface

This book deals with two main questions:

1. What are the barriers to the equality and the development of the Arabs in Israel?
2. How can the effect of these barriers be reduced?

The impetus for dealing with these questions was a conference, in which the emphasis was put on the inequality between Jews and Arabs in various areas: political representation, distribution of economic resources, cultural expression, and socioeconomic gaps. The works presented at the conference were published by the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies in 2004, in a book titled Jews and Arabs in Israel Facing a Changing Reality: Dilemmas, Trends, Scenarios and Recommendations, edited by Shlomo Hasson and Khaled Abu-Asba. The picture presented by the book is that despite certain improvements in the social area, especially in the area of education, the inequality between Jews and Arabs remains as it was. Against this background, a preliminary background has been outlined for the analysis of the fundamental barriers preventing equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel.


The necessity of examining the issue of barriers stems also from the processes of modernization and social mobility on the part of Arabs in Israel. The new generation, which has on the one hand been exposed to the values of equality, democracy, and human rights, and is on the other hand confronted by the existing gaps, has sharpened its criticism of the establishment and of the current policies, and has intensified the demand for civil equality and for the advancement of collective rights. These demands have focused upon a number of areas:

1. Correction of inequality in individual social benefits and public allocations, including allocation of sufficient land for Arab settlements.

2. Advancement of the educational system, both in the allocation of resources, and in granting administrative autonomy like that accepted in the state religious (Jewish mamlachti-dati) schools.

3. Opening of the labor market to Arabs in Israel, and encouragement of Arab entrepreneurship.

4. Advancement of collective rights and cultural autonomy.

It turns out that the various studies on inequality in these areas, as well as the demands raised by representatives of the Arab population, and even the various committees established in order to reduce the gaps, have not yielded the desired results, and the inequality remains as it has been. The question is: why? Why, to this day, has there not been a real change in the situation of the Arab population? Why have the dimensions of inequality not been reduced? Why has the gap remained virtually unchanged?

Providing answers to these questions requires an examination of the factors responsible for the inequality, and that is exactly the subject of this book. In our opinion, the source of inequality between Arabs and Jews, and of the difficulty of social mobility for Arab citizens in Israel, is in the many deep barriers which, for the most part, have not been thoroughly clarified or debated by researchers and policymakers dealing with the issue of relations between Jews and Arabs. The argument which guides the essays in this book is that without confronting the barriers, it will be very difficult to reduce inequality and to satisfy the demands of the representatives of the Arab population.

The literature reveals that serious discussion of the barriers began only in 1995, at a conference at The Center for Conflict Management at Stanford University. The important research on the subject had been mainly in the field of psychology, and to a lesser extent in the administrative and economic fields. We therefore chose to deal with the issue of barriers in a wider and more comprehensive way than they were dealt with in the previous book published in 2004. We asked Jewish and Arab researchers in the fields of law, sociology, psychology, political science, geography, and planning, to identify the barriers preventing equality between Arabs and Jews, and to propose ways of dealing with them. At the initiative of the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, this group of researchers gathered together to discuss the issue, in the framework of a two day seminar at Neve Ilan. At the seminar, discussion was held regarding barriers in various fields:

1. Barriers originating in the state's legal system;
2. Barriers originating in the cultural-political system;
3. Barriers originating in the psychological-cultural system;
4. Barriers originating in the socioeconomic system.

This book is a modest attempt to present position papers by researchers in various professions, each of whom has tried to sketch the barriers and the way to reduce them, according to his or her familiarity and knowledge.


Survey of the Chapters in the Book

Shlomo Hasson proposes a conceptual framework for the clarification of the barriers at the roots of inequality between Arabs and Jews. He differentiates between objective barriers, which are the result of the historical-social context, including the Jewish-Arab conflict, and subjective barriers, which include norms and values; between external barriers, originating in the conduct of governmental institutions and Jewish society, and internal barriers, originating in the minority group; and between barriers operating on the individual level and those operating on the collective level. According to those criteria, Hasson identifies eight fields of barriers which he classifies into six main areas:

1. Geopolitical Barriers originating in the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts, which nurture national sentiment and mutual distrust.
2. Political and Administrative Barriers originating in the desire to preserve institutional structures which grant a political and economic advantage to the Jewish population, and keep the Arab public out of positions of power and political influence, and retard economic mobility.
3. Legal Barriers which grant a superior status to the Jewish population in the determination of the character of the state.
4. Economic Barriers among the Arab public, originating in historical legacies, and the location in the social and spatial network.
5. Sociocultural Barriers among the Arab population, originating in the hierarchical structure, the character of leadership, the structure of family, personal ability and skills, and accepted traditions.
6. Psychological Barriers among the Jewish majority and the Arab minority groups, originating in norms, values, fears, and prejudices. These barriers affect all the other areas, and should be positioned at the base of the pyramid of barriers.

Hasson examines three strategies for reducing the barriers: a macro strategy which deals with the essence of the state and its character, a meso strategy which deals with the central areas of day-to-day life, including the economic, political, and cultural areas, and a micro strategy which deals with special issues.

The articles by Michael Karayanni, Ilan Saban, and Hassan Jabarin examine various barriers in the field of law, and Neta Ziv examines the way that membership in the legal profession affects the reduction of barriers.

Michael Karayanni, analyzing the barriers limiting the liberty and rights of the Arab citizen in Israel in the area of religion, identifies two barriers: an external barrier, in the conduct of the governmental system, and an internal barrier stemming from the autonomy of the religious communities. The source of these two barriers is what Karayanni calls "the separateness paradigm" – a paradigm which allows different treatment toward Jews and Arabs in the area of relations between religion, society, and state. According to that paradigm, the relations between religion, society, and state in the Jewish population are a part of the public sphere, and as such are subject to administrative and judicial review, which tends to honor liberal values. However, relations between religion, society, and state in the Arab population are generally part of the private-community sphere, and as such, their administrative and judicial review are limited. That barrier, on the one hand, is considerate of the existing framework of authority of the Arab religious communities and honors the principle of religious autonomy, including preservation of religious institutions and ways of life, but on the other hand limits individual liberty and does not honor the liberal principle of freedom from religion. It provides the religious community with external protection, and simultaneously allows the community to cast internal limitations upon its members.

The internal barrier, according to Karayanni, stems from the desire of the religious establishment to preserve its status, and it is supported by cultural, social, and national traditions. These traditions are patriarchal, and are characterized by religious conservatism and commitment to the value of protection of national interests, including communal religious expression.

The two barriers fuel each other. The state's aspiration to attain maximal control over the Arab population, by division of religious communities and preservation of traditional frameworks, is reinforced by the aspirations of the leaders of the religious communities to preserve their power. The result, as shown in Karayanni's analysis, is an intensified entrapment of the forces striving for liberation of the individual and for the advancement of the individual's liberal rights.

Ilan Saban discusses the role of the legal court in creating social change in the status of the Arab minority in Israel. In that context he analyzes the barriers which restrict its maneuvering room regarding the creation of a "vision of bridging" between the status quo (which is rejected by the Arab minority) and a bi-national state (which is supported by the Arab minority yet rejected by the majority Jewish population). The two main barriers which Saban describes are:

1. The majority community's fear of the minority community – fear which is intensified by the continuing Jewish-Arab conflict.
2. The Jewish population's view of the Zionist project as justified and continuing.

These two barriers are taboo areas of sorts, which the court cannot penetrate without risking losing public (social and political) and legal legitimacy. That does not mean that it does not confront these barriers. Saban notes that despite the existence of barriers, the court acts as "the guard at the gate" of democracy, in the relations between the majority and the minority, and contributes to the emergence of an Arab civil society. In this activity, the court creates a "vision of bridging," in which democratic commitment enjoys practical and comprehensive expression in the area of individual rights, prohibition of discrimination, and expansion of the communal rights granted to the minority. However, as it is aware of the danger of losing legitimacy, the court acts cautiously on the constitutional plane, including on the issue of the rights of the Arab minority. This caution explains the court's inconsistency in creating a vision of bridging and in refraining from taking advantage of all of its powers, as well as the limited types of relief which it is at liberty to grant in a situation of discrimination against the Arab minority group on issues of material resources.

Hassan Jabarin analyzes the legal rhetoric of the State Attorney's office, as it has appeared in cases on family unification and on state allowances for families with children. On the basis of analysis of these cases, Jabarin argues that a theoretical attitude which he calls "the policy of reasonable discrimination" lies at the foundation of the unequal treatment of the Arab minority. According to that policy, discrimination on issues of granting citizenship and of state allowances for families with children is presented as legitimate, due to the "ethnic superiority" of the majority group. Thus, for example, the opposition to family unification was justified by the State Attorney's office by the claim that the spouse who would receive Israeli citizenship as a result of the unification constitutes a future security risk. According to Jabarin, that reasoning reveals a stereotypical attitude, which is factually unsupported, that views every Arab as a security risk. According to Jabarin, the reasonable discrimination policy is deep rooted in the legal culture; it is what makes its rhetoric possible, and what is responsible for the continued discrimination against the Arab minority.

Neta Ziv indicates a way to lessen the barriers between the national majority and minority: belonging to a profession, and in the case under discussion – the legal profession. Belonging to the legal profession has four implications:

1. It grants common identity to Jews and Arabs, which exists beside the distinguished and separate identities.
2. It is an arena that allows the advancement of the Arab population, from the economic and social perspectives.
3. It creates a strong link to the state and its institutions.
4. It allows Arab attorneys to act within Arab civil society, to protect human rights and minority rights, and to promote social change.

Thus, the legal profession allows Arab attorneys to develop a link with the state and its institutions, and toward Jewish society, yet at the same time to challenge them, while advancing the rights of the Arab minority.

The articles by Menachem Mautner, Haim Ganz, and Amal Jamal focus upon the barriers in the cultural-political area.

Menachem Mautner examines the cultural identity barrier stemming from the definition of the State of Israel in Israeli law as "Jewish and democratic". In his opinion, that definition sends a signal to the Jewish population that only Jews live in the state, whereas the signal it sends to the Arab minority is that the state is not their state, and that they are second class citizens. The practical manifestation of that definition is the discrimination in allocation of resources and in political and administrative cooperation. In Mautner's opinion, confronting this barrier does not require exchanging the Jewish national identity with a new identity such as a bi-national state or a "state of all its citizens". In his opinion, Israel should preserve the "Jewish" component in the definition of its national identity, and add, beside it, a component expressing the fact that many Arab citizens live in the state. The proposed definition is "a Jewish and democratic state with a national Arab minority", or, alternatively, "a Jewish and democratic, multicultural state".

On the practical level, Mautner proposes reinforcing the components of identity which are common to Jewish and Arab citizens, such as the common Israeli culture and the commitment to democracy and to liberal principles of the political system and culture in the state. Aware of the possible conflict on the issue of alteration of the national identity, Mautner proposes a pragmatic approach which confronts the existing discrimination in allocation of material resources, as well as the teaching of the Arabic language in Jewish schools, integration of Arabs in civil society, and emphasis of the existence of a national minority in the public-legal discourse.

Haim Ganz analyzes the barrier regarding the common stance in Israel, according to which the Jews' right to self determination means a right to a nation state which grants Jews better rights than those granted to Arabs. That common stance, writes Ganz, is based upon four arguments:

1. The argument regarding the right to self determination, which is interpreted as the right to a hegemonic nation state. According to that argument, national minorities in nation states do not have rights equal to those of the national majority.
2. The common argument that "everybody does it."
3. The argument regarding persecution of the Jews.

4. The argument regarding the continuation of the conflict between Jews and Arabs. According to this argument, the continuation of the conflict means the continuation of the danger to the Jews, and thus the need for dominance.

Ganz rejects the first argument, which interprets the right to self determination as a right to a hegemonic nation state. From the conceptual point of view, argues Ganz, the right to self determination does not necessarily mean the right to a nation state, and can be manifest in autonomy. From the normative point of view, he claims, the right to self determination should not be interpreted as the right to ownership of the nation state. Although Ganz agrees to additional rights for the majority group, he writes that such rights should also be granted to the Arabs as a native people.

Regarding the three other arguments – "everybody does it", persecution of the Jews, and the continuation of the conflict – Ganz accepts them partially, especially the argument regarding the continuation of the conflict with the Arabs, which is based on existential fears. These arguments, and especially the argument regarding the continuation of the conflict, can serve, in his opinion, as justification for Jewish dominance of demography and security, but not of other areas such as symbols, land, distribution of power, and public space. Furthermore, claims Ganz, the validity of even those arguments is but temporary.

Amal Jamal focuses upon the cultural-political barrier responsible for the unequal representation of the Arab public in the Knesset and its institutions. In Jamal's opinion, that barrier is entrenched in the Jewish and Zionist character and identity of the state, as well as in the view of the Arab population in Israel as a threat to the state. All those factors have caused the Arab parties to be pushed away from the governments of Israel, and led to the prevention of their participation in decision making regarding the way of life of the Arab citizens of Israel. Like Haim Ganz, Jamal also claims that the right to self determination of the Jewish people has been translated into absolute hegemony of the Jewish majority group, which as such constitutes a central political barrier preventing both equality between Arabs and Jews, and expression of the national identity of the Arab citizens of Israel.

The articles by Eli Reches and Doron Navot, and by Amiram Gonen and Rassem Khamaisi, deal with the foci of power and their effect on the inequality between Arabs and Jews in Israel.

Eli Reches and Doron Navot deal with the foci of power in the Arab population in Israel, and the ability of those foci to remove or reduce barriers to equality and social mobility. According to these authors, in the present political structure, the ability of Arab power foci to contribute to the removal of barriers is limited.

In the opinion of Reches and Navot, the Arab local authorities, with their extended family (hamula) structure and their administration, constitute a barrier on the way to equality. Arab Knesset members attempt to advance substantive changes, write these authors, but only rarely do they succeed in any substantial parliamentary achievements. Moreover, extreme and harsh statements by Arab Knesset members intensify distrust of them by the Jewish majority, including Jewish Knesset members. Against that background, the central and important role of extra-parliamentary organizations like "Adalah", "Musawa", and "The Arab Center for Alternative Planning" stands out. In the opinion of Reches and Navot, these organizations fulfill a central and positive role in the struggle to remove the barriers.

Amiram Gonen and Rassem Khamaisi identify the bureaucratic-normative barrier, and discuss its role in perpetuating the inequality between Arabs and Jews in Israel. According to them, the district and local level officials ("the Government of Be'er Sheva") do not carry out the state's instructions, as determined at the national level ("The Government of Jerusalem"). Moreover, local officials shape their own policy, at times contradictory to the policy outlined at the national level, and limit the options of the Arab population.

According to Gonen and Khamaisi, the bureaucratic barrier is entrenched in a values-based view, according to which local officials are the ones who safeguard the national interest and the interests of the Jewish settlements in the area subject to their authority. According to that view, such protection is necessitated by reality, in light of the fact that the Arab public openly challenges the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish nation state, and due to the fact that in the space in which the local officials serve there are Arab settlements with a hostile attitude toward Israel.

The bureaucratic-normative barrier is intensified by the accepted attitude and modus operandi of the representatives of the Arab population. These representatives tend to see great importance in the political discourse with the bureaucracy on the national level, and underestimate the importance of the professional discourse with the local level bureaucracy. An additional factor which reinforces that barrier is the tendency of the press, and of researchers, to focus upon actions and decisions at the national level, and to ignore the exclusionary and discriminatory conduct which often characterizes the local level.

The essays by Yifat Maoz and Danny Stetman examine the barriers in the psychological and ideological area.

Yifat Maoz studies the psychological-attitudinal barriers of Israeli Jews, and examines how they affect the institutionalization of inequality between Arabs and Jews. She identifies two main attitudinal barriers: denial or ignoring of the existence of inequality; and justification of inequality by casting the responsibility on the group discriminated against. Denial of the existence of inequality, according to Maoz, can be reinforced through a number of basic tactics: focusing on cases which support the belief that equality exists, and ignoring cases which disprove it; and treating contradictory information (information which disproves the belief that equality exists) as exceptional, invalid, or biased.

Even when Jewish Israelis internalize the existence of inequality, that does not necessarily mean recognition of the need for equality. At that point, the justification barrier may arise, according to which inequality is legitimate and is merely a result of the behavior of the group discriminated against. The Arabs, according to this barrier, brought discrimination upon themselves, due to their lack of allegiance to the State of Israel, or due to the fact that they do not make efforts to get a higher level of education.

Both barriers – denial and justification – are entrenched in deeper psychological attitudes: intra-group preference which assigns positive characteristics to the national identity group in relation to the other group, justification of the conduct of the establishment, and a stereotypical attitude toward members of the Arab national minority.

Danny Stetman examines the common ideological and psychological factors in Jewish religious and ultra-orthodox society, and examines how they work against equal treatment of Arabs in Israel. Although positive attitudes toward the foreigner and the defenseless exist in the Jewish tradition, the common attitude in Jewish religious society toward the Arabs is hostile. The Arabs are seen as an enemy, and treated as "Amalek", the biblical sworn enemy of the People of Israel, and as "Erev Rav", the gentiles sent to spy on the People of Israel by Pharaoh. In Stetman's opinion, the origin of that attitude is the religious Jewish population's attempt to escape the position of social marginality it held until the 1970's, and to transform itself from led, to leader. That change was accompanied by the adoption of nationalist stands, including a hostile attitude toward the Arabs. An additional cause of hostility and extreme stances is the religious crisis which accompanied the adoption of secular national ideologies. These stances spread, according to Stetman, from the national religious population to the ultra-orthodox population, especially the population identified with the Shas movement, but also the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox population. Stetman believes that the religious population will not change its negative attitude toward the Arabs in the near future, and concludes in a pessimistic tone: "I do not know what can be done to advance such a change."

The articles by Khaled Abu-Asba and Sarab Aburabia-Kuidar deal with barriers in the area of education.

Khaled Abu-Asba discusses the educational system of the Arab minority in Israel. He argues that its development is very slow compared with the Jewish educational system, caused, in his opinion, by the following two barriers:

1. Lack of a policy that takes into account the national and religious uniqueness of the Palestinian minority in Israel; in other words, non-recognition of collective rights in the area of education.
2. Employment of a discriminatory and unequal policy toward the Arab educational system.

These two barriers are entrenched, according to Abu-Asba, in political interests and ideology which view the Arab educational system as a suspect zone, which must be supervised and controlled. That attitude leads the Arab population to feel alienated from the system, a result manifest in lack of commitment on the part of parents.

Overcoming these barriers requires action of two sorts:

1. Transfer of resources that can ensure closure of the gap;
2. Granting of collective rights to the Arab minority in the area of management of education, including the establishment of a pedagogic framework within the existing educational system, as accepted in the state religious [Jewish mamlachti-dati] schools.

Sarab Aburabia-Quidar focuses on the discrimination against girls in the Bedouin educational system. One of the results of that discrimination is the high dropout rates of more than 60% among girls, just at the juncture between middle school and high school. She argues that the main cause of the dropout rate is the stance of the Israeli educational system, which ignores the needs of Bedouin society and culture, and forces upon it a modern educational system, in which boys and girls learn together. These frameworks are at odds with the traditional values of Bedouin society, and lead to a substantial conflict at the age of puberty, which coincides with the age of graduation from middle school to high school. For these reasons, Bedouin families even prefer that their daughters cease their studies in order to avoid being forced to study in mixed schools in which boys and girls study together.

Aburabia-Quidar notes that there are those who blame Bedouin society and define it as a society of embarrassment and shame. However, in her opinion, the source of the problem is the close-mindedness of the Israeli establishment regarding the cultural values of Bedouin society, and its unwillingness to allocate resources sufficient to solve the problem. For example, separate schools for boys and for girls can solve the problem.

Those who "fall between two stools" are the Bedouin female pupils who find themselves caught between two cultures: western culture, and its modern values, and a traditional culture which expects them to uphold contradictory values. In Aburabia-Quidar's opinion, the way to progress is building from within the tradition, toward the outside. That approach aspires to advance the modernization process through activity of women within the tradition and the community.

Itzhak Schnell and Michael Sopher analyze the barriers blocking development of Arab economical entrepreneurship. They identify eight central barriers:

1. Lack of proper physical infrastructure;
2. Difficulty in raising capital;
3. Lack of institutions, within the Arab sector and on the national and regional levels, for allocating capital for development;
4. Insufficient numbers of highly skilled workers;
5. Distance from large markets;
6. Dependency due to ownership by Jewish factories;
7. Inability to penetrate Jewish markets;
8. Low levels of activity, which make confronting monopolies difficult.

The conclusion reached by Schnell and Sopher is that only when the situation of inequality reaches a point at which the marginal pole of the economy (in other words, the economic situation of the Arabs) disturbs the core's growth and ability to aggregate capital (in other words, the Jews' economic situation), can the mechanisms capable of changing the unequal structure be established.

Itzhak Reiter analyzes the barriers operating in the area of provision of religious services to Muslims in the State of Israel. He focuses upon three central areas: allocation of governmental resources for Muslim religious services, reestablishment of abandoned mosques, and return of property of the Waqf (the Muslim religious endowment). In the area of allocation of governmental resources for Muslim religious services, Reiter identifies a unilateral barrier linked to discrimination in budgeting. In the two areas of reestablishment of abandoned mosques and the return of Waqf property, Reiter identifies a bilateral barrier preventing a shift in the status quo. On the one hand, argues Reiter, representatives of the Arab minority, primarily the representatives of the Islamic movement, present exaggerated demands which challenge the values and national interests of the members of the Jewish majority group. On the other hand, the institutions of the state, which strive to defend the national interest and the values of the public, reveal a lack of flexibility and openness regarding the demands of the Arab minority. In his opinion, under those conditions it is possible to advance a compromise solution based upon the establishment of a governmental compensation fund. The fund would be administered by a body run in partnership by the government and the Muslim community, and representatives of the Muslim community would be elected to their positions by the Muslim population.

Eran Razin argues that in the 1990's, progress occurred in the area of allocation of public resources to the Arab population, and there was a certain decrease in discrimination. However, at the turn of the 21st century, the barriers resurfaced, and the achievements of the 1990's deteriorated. Razin sees the cause of this deterioration in three main areas:

1. Barriers stemming from the security tension and its resultant economic crisis. The prominent characteristics of these barriers are as follows: intensification of the national conflict with the Palestinian Authority and identification on the part of Arabs in Israel with the Palestinian Authority, decreasing political power of Arab Knesset members, and a general deepening suspicion toward the Arab population, which have naturally eroded the willingness of the Jewish population and decision makers to act to reduce discrimination.
2. Barriers which stem from the weakening of the welfare state and the decrease in public expenditures. The prominent characteristic of these barriers has been cutbacks in support for the weaker socioeconomic strata, of which the Arabs have become a central part.
3. Barriers stemming from the tendency of Arab society to persist in traditional governance patterns and from deterioration of the process of political modernization in Arab society in Israel. The prominent characteristics have been strengthening of the hamula [extended family] model in local government, alongside traditional and faulty governance patterns.

Against the background of those barriers, notes Razin, the demands for civil equality and the advancement of collective rights have intensified, and some even recommend a radical strategy, whose prominent representatives belong to the young, "upright" generation. Razin recommends, however, an approach of pragmatism and compromise.

Rassem Khamaisi claims that ownership of private land, which in most societies constitutes a booster of development, becomes a factor retarding development in Arab society in Israel. He identifies external and internal barriers which prevent private land from becoming a booster of development. The external barriers stem from the structure and conduct of the governmental establishment, and the internal barriers stem from cultural and behavioral characteristics of Arab society.

The external barriers stem from expropriation of land from Arabs by the state, and the planning and housing policy which is biased in favor of the Jewish majority. These processes have aggravated concerns of Arab landowners regarding the future of their lands, and have exhausted their confidence in the existing planning system. Thus, landowners refuse to put their lands on the market, and preserve them for their heirs, guided by a sense of family, cultural, and national commitment.

The internal barriers stem from the fact that the agrarian society views land as a value, and from the customs dictating the bequeathal of land. The division of land between multiple possessors – heirs or purchasers, and the conflicts and contradictions between the possessors, retard the development of land. Moreover, private landowners oppose any allocation of their lands for public purposes, and they thus retard the development of public space, as well as the services and employment for the local population which that development entails.

Both types of barriers, external and internal, reinforce each other. Past experience, including expropriation of lands by the state, encourages Arab landowners not to sell their lands, and to instead hold on to them for future generations.

The way to break through the internal barriers, in Khamaisi's opinion, is to create a relationship of trust, based upon allocation of land by the state for the Arab sector, including returning expropriated land which has not been used, expanding the jurisdiction boundaries of Arab settlements, and increasing the supply of state land for the development of housing and public building in the Arab sector.

What can be Done: Strategies for Action

The discussion by Arab and Jewish researchers of various barriers enables everyone on either side to penetrate the consciousness of the other, and to consider its emphases. The various articles show that beyond the differing approaches, there is consensus regarding the centrality of the barriers stemming from the definition of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, the continuation of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the psychological-normative views of both sides. These views, which are entrenched in various national links, become more acute as a result of the continuing conflict, and are characterized by suspicion, and even distrust. These barriers indicate that the internal schism between Jews and Arabs in Israel does not end at the state boundaries. Quite the contrary: it is deeply affected by the processes occurring beyond the border. As a result, as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict continues, the barriers grow higher, making difficult the reduction of inequality in a wide spectrum of areas: political representation, economic development, social mobility, education, and allocation of services and land.

There are differences between researchers regarding these barriers, and accordingly, various strategies for action are proposed. A differentiation can be made between, on the one hand, pessimistic approaches, which see the status quo as a trap and as a dead end, which blocks any possibility of raising any sort of recommendation; and on the other hand, proposals for radical change, which are raised between the lines, especially regarding the character of the state. However, between the two ends of the spectrum, there are indications of consensus in most cases regarding the need for an intermediate approach which can be called a "realistic strategy". That strategy is based upon a pragmatic view, whose four components are as follows:

1. Depth. The articles raise the need to understand the link between the clear problems of inequality, and the geopolitical and political barriers, and the psychological attitudes deeply rooted in the public consciousness (Maoz, Stetman). Thus, it would be naïve to continue the research of inequality between Jews and Arabs, and to formulate policy for its reduction, without taking into account the deep barriers which make difficult the outlining of policy, and its implementation. Nor is it sufficient to outline policy at the national level; close monitoring of the barriers which characterize the conduct of the local level is needed (Gonen and Khamaisi). The media and academic research have an important role in locating these barriers, and raising them to the surface.
2. Complexity. The various articles present multidimensional and complex discussion of a wide spectrum of problems. In light of the existence of deep barriers in the geopolitical and psychological areas, any attempt to focus the strategy for action on merely one area, such as the identity and character of the state, is liable to turn out to be barren, and seen as illegitimate (Mautner, Saban). The opposition on this point is great, and the choice to attempt to attack this particular issue, is liable to cause the failure of attempts to advance changes in other areas, in which the chances of success are higher. Instead of focusing upon one issue, action on a wide spectrum of areas should be preferred, while being aware of and sensitive to constraints, but also taking advantage of opportunities. On the other hand, in order to maintain an effective process of discourse and a common aspiration to a more just reality, demands in the Arab minority for changes in the components of the identity of the State of Israel, which the Jewish public sees as fundamental facts, should not be rejected offhand. Just as the majority has feelings, so too does the Arab minority in Israel have its own feelings regarding its past, its people, its heritage, and its future.
3. Continuation and Compromise. There is a need for continual and practical treatment of the various barriers, while taking the existing constraints into account and taking advantage of opportunities. In such activity, long term programs for action, which anticipate the future and advance prudently and gradually toward moderating the barriers, should be prepared. The existence of deep barriers makes change – the reduction of the disparities – difficult. Against that background, the development of approaches based upon compromise in the area of religious services, education, and allocation of resources and land to the Arab local authorities is proposed (Abu-Asba, Aburabia-Quidar, Razin, Khamaisi).
4. Action from the top-down and from the bottom-up. Some of the action in confronting the barriers will be taken from above by governmental institutions, and some from below by civil society.

Action with such a practical approach regarding governmental institutions has been proposed in various areas. One of the recommendations is to create change in the attitude toward the Arab educational system, while increasing the volume of resources and allowing administrative autonomy, as accepted in the state religious (Jewish mamlachti-dati) schools (Abu-Asba). Changes from within government institutions are also proposed in allocation of resources to local authorities (Razin) and for religious services (Reiter), and in allocation of land to Arab localities (Mautner, Khamaisi). These changes can be made even without radical solutions to the barriers stemming from the national conflict and the psychological attitudes linked to it, and might contribute to a change in attitudes and to the advancement of trust between Arabs and Jews. However, as long as these barriers remain, advancing the proposed changes will be very difficult, and change will be slow to occur.

Some researchers have also proposed pragmatic action on the civil society level. Thus, for example, women play a central role in advancing change in the education of girls in Bedouin society. The proposed change is based on action from within the traditional and community framework, while attempting to bridge between tradition and modernity (Aburabia-Quidar). Membership in professions like the legal profession and action from within them, also play an important role. Within that framework, a new field is being outlined, in which there is a strong link to state institutions and a strong link to civil society, while presenting state institutions with a challenge (Ziv). It is actually the civil society organizations, which deal with education, research, and the changing of attitudes, and the defense organizations which receive aid from attorneys, which are likely to contribute to the closing of gaps more than other factors (Reches and Navot). In this regard, the proposal to move the center of gravity of research and media coverage from decisions on the national level to conduct and decisions of the officials on the local and regional levels should be pointed out (Gonen and Khamaisi). The contribution of civil society in moderating gaps signals the need to soften the ethnic category and the dualism of majority-minority relations, and instead consider the social organizations in the majority and minority groups which work together to moderate gaps and reduce inequality.

A central role in penetrating the barriers is credited to the court of justice, which is described as the guard at the gates of democracy (Saban). Despite all the criticism of its cautious conduct and its inconsistency in safeguarding minority rights (Jabarin), its action, together with civil society organizations, makes an important contribution to the advancement of equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel. The court's activity also indicates the need to create subtler differentiations in the establishment's attitude toward majority-minority relations, and the need to identify different forces within the establishment which have different approaches.

The conflict resolution doctrine holds that the best solution is one in which both feuding parties end up with what they wanted. It is impossible to solve the conflict without each of the groups understanding what the other group wants, and what, in that group's opinion, prevents the realization of its aspirations. In other words, it is impossible to understand the relationship between Jews and Arabs, and to advance equality and development, without taking into account the heritage, the past, the fears, and the hopes of each side, and the way that each side identifies and interprets the barriers on the way to equality. These processes require joint learning and the creation of common knowledge by the representatives of both sides. We hope that this book makes a modest contribution to furthering that goal.